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I.

Introduction
Even though the current level of irregular migration into Europe is only a fraction of the

peak flow during the refugee crisis in 2015, the issue continues to fuel a polarizing international
debate. Some conservative politicians describe it as an “invasion” or threat to domestic
tranquility while humanitarian organizations call it a protracted crisis.1 In fact, around the world,
there are still 25.9 million refugees and 3.5 million asylum seekers waiting for a determination of
their refugee status.2 Interestingly, at the end of 2016, around 84% of the world’s refugees lived
in countries in the “global south.”3 Thus, with some distance from the height of the crisis, this
moment offers a chance to step back and reevaluate the means of international cooperation in
border management. After all, refugee protection will remain a persistent issue as some parts of
the world, including Spain, continue to experience an influx of irregular migrants.
Over the last decade, the European Union faced significant challenges in processing and
absorbing migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa and other regions in the global south.
This gave rise to a body of international agreements that allowed European states to partner
with neighboring countries to divide the responsibility of refugee protection. However, as this
paper will argue, these procedural measures under the name of responsibility sharing have
devolved into an avoidance of the obligations that these states committed to in the 1951
Refugee Convention, the cornerstone of international refugee law. Moreover, obligations for
refugee protection have become a political negotiation chip between EU and North African

1

Patrick Kingsley, Migration to Europe is Down Sharply. So is it still a crisis? New York Times (Jun. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/world/europe/europe-migrant-crisis-change.html.
2
Figures at a Glance, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Jun. 19, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/enus/figures-at-a-glance.html.
3
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (June 20, 2017),
http://www.unhcr. org/5943e8a34.
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countries. This represents a departure from the intended rights-based framework and ultimately
deprives asylum seekers of the rights to which they are entitled.
This paper begins with an overview of the international conventions that establish the
rights of refugees and asylum seekers. Section III describes the more recent agreements and
instruments for responsibility sharing that jeopardize the rights of migrants through border
control and migrant processing procedures. Finally, section IV discusses the implications for the
next stage of refugee protection initiatives including the recently announced Global Compact on
Refugees.

II.

Background: International Conventions
International refugee law is anchored by both international treaties specific to the subject

matter as well as regional conventions. To provide the background legal context, this section
presents an overview of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the European Convention on Human Rights.
Importantly, these three documents all emphasize the human rights of refugees and asylum
seekers as well as the consequent state obligations to preserve these rights. In this respect, these
documents stand in sharp contrast to the more contractual nature of the more recent international
instruments amongst European countries or between Europe and North African countries
discussed in Section III.

A. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
While the people that fled their home countries after World War I were deemed to be the
first refugees in the 20th Century, international agreements and conventions took time to develop
4

and eventually culminated in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the
Convention”) following the end of World War II.4 The Convention is rooted in Article 14 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which recognizes the right of persons to seek
asylum from persecution in other countries.5 Around the world, 146 states are party to the
Convention and have consented to be bound to the Convention, including EU member countries,
Morocco, and Tunisia.6 More specifically, the Convention guarantees the rights of people that
qualify for the legal of definition of “refugee” as determined by the state in which the person
applied for asylum. To that end, the Convention is legally binding and Article 38 refers all
disputes to the International Court of Justice while Article 35 provides the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees with supervisory authorities.7 However, to date, there have been no
real or legal consequences to non-compliance.
This section begins with understanding the scope of the Convention through (i) the
definition of refugee and the defined state obligations, including (ii) non-refoulement and (iii)
certain social and economic rights. Given the focus of this paper on responsibility sharing, the
section ends with (iv) a discussion of the only mention of the concept in Recital 4 in the
Preamble of the Convention.

i.

Definition of “refugee”

4

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (September 2011), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html.
5
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN General Assembly, 28 July 1951, United Nations, available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
6
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en.
7
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN General Assembly, 28 July 1951, United Nations, available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
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The definition of refugee is important because it determines the scope and reach of the
Convention. To that end, there are two aspects to the scope of refugee protection: first, the rights
guaranteed for refugees based on the text of the Convention and second, the principles for
enforcing the rights.
First, based on Article 1(A)(2), a refugee is when someone with a
“well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.”8
Article 1(B)(1) limits the definition of refugees to those whose well-founded fear is a result of
events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.9 Both the temporal and geographic criteria
serve to restrict the universe of people who could claim refugee status to an existing population
as governments were unwilling to “sign a blank cheque and undertake obligations toward future
refugees, the origin and number of which would be unknown.”10
There are several key elements of this definition that have become assessment criteria for
adjudicating refugee status. First, “well-founded fear of being persecuted” combines both
objective and subjective assessments because “fear” is a subjective state of mind but the qualifier
“well-founded” means that the “fear” must be supported by the prevailing condition or situation

8

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN General Assembly, 28 July 1951, United Nations, available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
9
Patrick Wall, A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility Sharing Fulfil
the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?, 29 Int J Refugee Law 201, 201 (2017).
10
Patrick Wall, A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility Sharing Fulfil
the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?, 29 Int J Refugee Law 201, 202 (2017), citing Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Statelessness and Related Persons, UN doc E/1618 (17 Feb. 1950) 38.
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in the applicant’s country of origin.11 The subjective element requires an assessment of
credibility, which takes into account a person’s membership in racial, religious, national, social
or political groups, and personal experiences, which includes experiences of friends, relatives
and other members that may show that the applicant will also soon be a victim.12 The credibility
assessment involves evaluating the reliability of applicant’s documents, any inconsistencies in
the applicant’s evidence and inconsistency with Country of Origin information.13 The second
element is “persecution.” While the term has not been universally defined, it typically includes
threat to life or freedom or any other serious violations of human rights on account of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group.14 Relatedly,
agents of persecution could be government authorities but is not limited to such. Persecution can
also occur when a government knowingly tolerates seriously discriminatory or other offensive
acts by the local populace, even if they are against established local laws.15 Third, “for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” means
that the adjudicator must analyze all possible nexus, which refers to these categories.16 While it
is immaterial how many of these aforementioned reasons apply, mere membership in a certain
group is usually insufficient as there would need to be special circumstances affecting the group.

11

Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (January 1992),
https://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf.
12
Id.
13
Asylum Systems Quality Assurance and Evaluation Mechanism Project in the Central and Eastern Europe Subregion (ASQAEM) Checklists, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Feb. 2010),
https://www.unhcr.org/hu/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2016/12/ASQAEM_Check_lists.pdf.
14
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (January 1992),
https://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Asylum Systems Quality Assurance and Evaluation Mechanism Project in the Central and Eastern Europe Subregion (ASQAEM) Checklists, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (February 2010),
https://www.unhcr.org/hu/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2016/12/ASQAEM_Check_lists.pdf.
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The fourth element is “unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.” The “unable” prong refers to circumstances beyond the will of the individual
applicant concerned. For example, in times of war, a country cannot extend effective protection
to its people. The “unwilling” prong somewhat qualifies the high standard set by “unable.”
However, it is combined with the qualifier “owing to such fear” to limit the exception because
applicants from countries where national protection is available generally not qualify for refugee
status. 17
The second aspect of understanding the extent of the protection offered by the
Convention is the principles for enforcing the definition. According to the text of the
Convention, refugee status is constitutive, which means that anyone who fulfills the criteria is
entitled to the enumerated rights. However, in reality, when someone arrives at a country to
apply for refugee protection, the country must first evaluate their circumstances and then
determine whether refugee status is warranted. Accordingly, said receiving country maintains
significant control over the treatment and protection of migrants. Refugee is thus an adjudicated
legal status.
The 1951 Refugee Convention laid out a set of criteria that qualifies an individual for
refugee protection while also restricting the population that could claim the status.18 As a result,
before the receiving country recognizes such a status, the applicant is legally only someone
seeking asylum. While the term “asylum seeker” is not specifically defined in the Convention,

17

Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Jan. 1992),
https://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf.
18
Pavle Kilibarda, Obligations of transit countries under refugee law: A Western Balkans case study, International
Review of the Red Cross 99, no. 904 (2017): 211-239.

8

asylum seeker describes a migrant who is seeking recognition as a refugee. While not every
asylum seeker will be recognized as a refugee, every refugee started out as an asylum seeker.19

ii.

Principle of non-refoulement

The Convention enumerates refugee rights through listing obligations of the contracting
states. For example, Article 32 of the 1951 Refugee provides that refugees can be expelled only
with due process of law.20 See Appendix 1. This section focuses on Article 33, “Prohibition of
Expulsion or Return (“Refoulement”),” because of its relevance to this topic at hand and because
the concept of non-refoulement has risen beyond mere recognition by the signatories of the
Convention to the level of customary international law. 21 Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention states that
“1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a particular
social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country
in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” (Emphasis
added).
The phrases “where his life or freedom would be threatened” and “in any manner whatsoever”
prohibit both direct and indirect refoulement. 22 The latter refers to returning a refugee not to the

19

What’s the difference between a refugee and an asylum seeker? Amnesty International Australia (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.amnesty.org.au/refugee-and-an-asylum-seeker-difference/
20
UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
21
Gretchen Borchelt, The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union: A Misguided Approach to Asylum
Law and Violation of International Human Rights Standards, 33 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 473, 479 (2002),
citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 102(2) cmt. c (1987).
22
Gretchen Borchelt, The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union: A Misguided Approach to Asylum
Law and Violation of International Human Rights Standards, 33 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 473, 479 (2002).
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state of origin but to a third state, where the refugee would still be at risk of further persecution
or at risk of being sent back to the country of origin. Given these obligations imposed on
contracting states, the prohibition of refoulement is understood to be a human-rights based
limitation imposed upon states' sovereign right to restrict the entry and stay of asylum-seekers.23
Nevertheless, just as there are principles for understanding the definition of refugee, there
is more to the right of nonrefoulement than the text in the Convention. While contracting parties
of an international convention express their agreement through ratification and their willingness
to bind themselves legally, the nuance and true impact of these conventions depends on means of
implementation, which can be controversial as it involves other relevant regional or international
agreements. The 1951 Convention is no exception and non-refoulement is a great example of the
resulting complexity. The act of refoulement could be interpreted narrowly so that it “does not
create a right of admission to the territory per se.”24 This is because the difference between the
right to seek asylum and the right to be granted asylum is debated and creates differences in
implementation protocols like the Dublin III Regulation in Europe (discussed below).25 As
another example, the geographic reach of the non-refoulement duties, or where and when this
obligation arises, has also been debated. According to some interpretations, “the nonrefoulement principle presupposes some kind of contact between the State and the protectionseeker.”26 Accordingly, some European countries have attempted to avoid such contact.27 In
contrast, the Human Rights Committee interprets jurisdiction to be more than just geographic

23

Id.
Cathryn Costello, Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored, 12
Human Rights Law Review 287，292 (2012).
25
Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection, 33
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 42, 44 (2015).
26
Cathryn Costello, Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored, 12
Human Rights Law Review 287，288 (2012).
27
Id.
24
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scope and includes “anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State party.”28 As such, the non-refoulement obligation would
apply in at least some border situations, even if there is not direct contact with European soil.29
Lastly, while the 1951 Convention only applies the right of non-refoulement to the definition of
refugees, countries must also take into account Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which also provides that “no State
Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believe that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”
(emphasis added).30 This means that the right to non-refoulement applies to all migrants.

iii.

Other civil, political, social and economic rights granted through the Convention

In addition to the key principle of non-refoulement, the Convention articles outline
refugees’ legal rights and obligations of the state. There are two primary levels of rights granted
to refugees: the same rights as enjoyed by nationals of the receiving country or the same rights as
enjoyed by foreign nationals in the receiving country. For example, Article 13 entitles refugees
to treatment no less favorable than aliens in the same circumstances when it comes to acquisition
of movable and immovable property.31 Article 16 entitles refugees the same access to courts as

28

Id. at 293, citing Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: The nature of the general legal obligation
imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 12 May 2004, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 195; 11 IHRR 905 (2004).
29
Id. at 295.
30
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1984), available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx. Article I of the Convention Against Torture defines
“torture” to be “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as…punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reasons based on discrimination of any
kind…”
31
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations General Assembly (Jul. 28, 1951) available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
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nationals. Additionally, the Convention includes civil and political rights. According to Article 4,
refugees are entitled to the same treatment as nationals in terms of freedom to practice their
religion. In terms of economic rights, Article 17 grants refugees the same rights as foreign
nationals in the same circumstances with regards to the right to engage in wage-earning
employment.32

iv.

Burden Sharing

While the body of the Convention laid out the substantive rights guaranteed by the
contracting parties, the Preamble is significant for our purposes of understanding international
responsibility sharing. Recital 4 of the Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention states that
“the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a
satisfactory solution of a problem… cannot therefore be achieved without international
co-operation.”33
However, neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol includes any specific
mechanisms for distributing the responsibility or burden.
Despite the Convention’s role in setting up the modern refugee protection regime, it
would be difficult to deem Recital 4 as the origin of the concept of burden sharing.34 The drafting
history of the Convention reveals that the concept had already been contemplated at the time of
drafting but it was the means in which it was written into the Convention that represented a
political compromise. On the one hand, some countries like France proposed for the concept to
be included in the body of the Convention, in an article on admission of refugees.35 On the other

32

Id.
Id.
34
Claire Inder, The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime, 29 Int. J Refugee
Law 523, 541 (2017).
35
Id.
33
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hand, it was ultimately removed from the body of the Convention because other countries like
the U.S. and China did not want to create a positive obligation to accept refugees from other
countries.36 It is clear from its current place in the Preamble that it does not create legal
obligations like the articles in the body of the Convention. Nevertheless, the ultimate inclusion of
the concept still suggest that it is important for the refugee protection at large because it stands
out as the only clause discussing responsibility amongst contracting states while every other
clause creates obligations by contracting states to refugees.
Since Recital 4 did not create legal obligations, the concept of burden sharing would at
most be “soft law.” Nevertheless, the concept has been of continued interest in the international
community. More than six decades later, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants is an unanimously-adopted UN resolution in which all 193 member states committed to
sharing the international responsibility of protecting refugees more equitably and predictably. 37
As seen with developments in international environmental law, concepts in soft law can become
origin for positive obligations that “harden” into binding agreements overtime.38 Thus, even
though neither the Convention nor subsequent international agreements have created a legal
obligation for international cooperation, it is important to understand its current manifestations
and their consequences in order to better understand where there is room for improvement in our
current refugee protection regime.

36

Id. at 549.
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html.
38
Claire Inder, The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime, 29 Int. J Refugee
Law 523, 551 (2017).
37
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B. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
The 1967 Protocol extended the definition of a refugee to our current understanding. The
Protocol enlarged the scope and reach of the 1951 Refugee Convention by removing the
temporal and geographic limitations. As a result, “protection would be available to any person
with a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons set out in the Convention,
regardless of when or where the events that gave rise to that fear occurred.”39 This represents a
significant shift from the 1951 definition. With the previous temporal and geographic limits, the
number of people who qualify for refugee status decreased over time and countries’ obligations
therefore decreased over time. After 1967, however, contracting states’ obligations become
ongoing as the number of refugees in the world that states must receive and protect could
increase without limit.

C. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
While international treaties set a baseline framework, regional conventions and national
legislations build on top of them and create various additional obligations as well as regionally
specific approaches to implementation. For example, the ECHR and the Convention both
prohibit the expulsion of refugees but the former elaborates on additional refugee protections
such as access to effective legal remedy (Article 13).40 Established by Article 19 of the ECHR,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) enforces the ECHR. This document binds 47

39

Patrick Wall, A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility Sharing Fulfil
the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?, 29 Int J Refugee Law 201, 202 (2017).
40
European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, Aravailable at:
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
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signatory states, which includes all members of the European Union.41 While the scope of this
paper precludes a thorough analysis of case law that interprets the articles of the ECHR, the key
provisions relevant to the protection of refugees, namely Article 1, Article 13, and Article 4 of
Protocol 4, are discussed below with the accompaniment of a few select case examples. See
Appendix 2.
First, both the text of the ECHR and case law from the ECtHR have helped define the
jurisdiction of ECHR, which affects the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe because
ECHR also speaks on the right of migrants. Article 1 of the ECHR states that
“the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”42
This text suggests that that the jurisdiction of the signatory states determines the extent of the
contracting states’ obligations. The ECtHR takes a functional approach whereby either de jure
and de facto jurisdiction can trigger the application of the ECHR.43 More concretely, case law
has established that de facto jurisdiction can be established based on control over a territory,44
control over persons,45 or in a combination of the territorial and personal factors and a
background exercise of public powers.46 As such, jurisdiction is more of a legal determination
rather than a geographical concept when it comes to human rights under the ECHR. Importantly,
case law on Article 1 extends the reach of refugee protections in ECHR beyond the rights

41

Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005 (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms), Council of Europe Treaty Office, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=Tcmz0DVm.
42
European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, available at:
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
43
Cathryn Costello, Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored, 12
Human Rights Law Review 287，298 (2012).
44
Loizidou v Turkey [1995] ECtHR, Application no. 15318/89
45
Medvedyev v France [2010] ECtHR, Application no. 3394/03
46
Al-Skeini v United Kingdon [2011] ECtHR, Application. 55721/07.
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granted in the 1951 Convention because the latter only applies to those that have gained refugee
status while the rights for aliens apply to anyone within the ECHR’s jurisdiction, regardless of
whether they have gained refugee status.47
Besides case law, domestic legislation often represents a certain interpretation of the
obligations flowing from international agreements. Spain, a country that receives a
disproportionately high inflow of migrants because of its geographic location at the border of the
EU territory, is one example where a domestic interpretation hurts refugees. Just as the principle
of non-refoulement can be interpreted narrowly, Spain’s 2009 Asylum Act qualifies its guarantee
of refugee protection by only recognizing the right to seek “international protection” as opposed
to asylum for those who are present in the Spanish territory.48 These localized interpretations
raise the bars set by the Convention and ECHR and makes it more difficult for asylum seekers to
assert their qualifications.
Second, Article 13, which require states to provide access to effective legal remedy, is
generally applicable to everyone within ECHR jurisdiction but particularly important in the
refugee context. For example, the case of N.D. and N.T. v Spain involved a Malian and an
Ivorian who tried to cross from Morocco into Spain when the Spanish Guardia Civil and the
Moroccan law enforcement officials violently pursued them and turned them over to Moroccan
authorities without inquiring about their identification or personal circumstance.49 The ECtHR
did not require “an automatically suspensive remedy” that would halt removal, but an effective

47

Elzbieta Hanna Morawska, Protection Against Expulsion in the European Convention on Human Rights, 6 Polish
Rev. Int’l & Eur. L. 10, 13 (2017).
48
Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection, 33
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 42, 55 (2015), citing Ley 12/2009 de 30 de octubre, reguladora del derecho
de asilo y de la protección subsidiaria; BOE núm. 263, of 31 October.
49
N.D. and N.T. v Spain, 8675/15 and 8697/15, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 3 October
2017, p. 39, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,59d3a7634.html.
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possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by way of a thorough examination of a
complaint in an independent and impartial domestic forum.50 In conjunction with the prohibition
of expulsion in Article 4 of Protocol 4, this echoes the due process requirement in Article 32 of
the 1951 Refugee Convention and provides more clarity into what such a process should look
like in the European context.
Third, Article 4 of Protocol 4 prohibits collective expulsion of aliens and is directly on
point with regards to protection of migrant rights. The substance of the right comes through case
law and fills in some gaps left by the Convention. For example, Hirsi Jamaa v Italy was the 2009
case about Italian pushbacks, where Italian Coast Guards intercepted three boats carrying asylum
seekers from Libya, transferred them to Italian warships headed towards Tripoli, and turned them
over to Libyan authorities upon arrival at the port, all without inquiring about their identity,
potential need for international protection, and qualification for refugee status.51 In Hirsi Jamaa
v Italy, the Grand Chamber, an appellate body sitting above the ECtHR, established that
indiscriminately processing applications without consideration of migrants’ individual
circumstances violates Article 4 of Protocol 4.52 Specifically, the undisputed fact that individuals
on the boats did not go through any identification procedure, that the personnel on the warships
were not trained to conduct individual interviews, and the absence of interpreters and legal
advisors constituted sufficient evidence for failure to fulfill the ECHR’s guarantees of individual
examinations.53 Additionally, the jurisdiction of this article also applies extra-territorially.54 This

50

Id.
Id.
52
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human
Rights, para 185, 23 February 2012, available at: https://www.refworld.org/casesECHR,4f4507942.html.
53
Id.
54
Cathryn Costello, Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored, 12
Human Rights Law Review 287, 323 (2012).
51
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means that asylum seekers cannot be returned without an individual examination of their
application, even if officials of a contracting state encountered the migrants outside of the
borders of the state.
All in all, these localized sources of law can extend asylum rights as the ECHR had done
or curb them, as legislation like the Spanish Asylum Act had done. At a macro level, the
differences in local implementation protocol further plays into the overall dynamics of the
refugee protection system, as detailed below in the actual mechanisms of burden sharing.
III.

Instruments of Responsibility Sharing
Despite the protections guaranteed by the Convention and ECHR, EU procedures for

border management have departed from the human rights-focused framework. This section
discusses various instruments of responsibility sharing, such as the Asylum Procedure Directives
(APD) and bilateral agreements for mobility partnerships. Through mechanisms for deflecting
migrants to third countries or incentivizing countries to readmit asylum seekers, European
countries have used these instruments to offload its obligations under the Convention and the
ECHR, leaving refugees and asylum seekers without the international protection and the rights
guaranteed by those conventions.

A. The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Dublin III Regulation
While the Convention does not provide guidance on the means for distributing
responsibility, the APD and the Dublin III Regulation help fill that gap through procedures like
the safe third country mechanism. When applying border procedures in reality, the safe third
country mechanism provides one example showing that state responsibilities are not as
straightforward as outlined in the Convention and the ECHR.
18

The goal of the APD was to standardize the asylum applications process and spread out
the responsibility of taking in and providing for refugees. Adopted by the European Parliament
and the European Council in 2013, the APD is an EU directive, which means that it is a
legislative act that sets out an objective that all EU countries must achieve but the legislation
itself does not dictate the means that individual countries utilize to achieve the objective.55 The
APD builds on ECHR and provides procedures for granting and withdrawing migrant
protection.56 For example, Chapter II of the APD provides basic guarantees such as right to
information and counselling to be provided at border crossing points and detention facilities.57
Chapter III outlines “Procedures at First Instance,” which include specific rules such as a time
limit that the examination for asylum should be concluded within six months of the application
as well as broader concepts like safe third country.58 Chapter V provides for “Appeals
Procedures,” which include allowing applicants or asylum seekers to remain in the territory until
the time limit for exercising their right to effective remedy has expired.59
Since the APD is a directive, the safe third country rules operate in conjunction with the
Dublin III Regulation, the latest in the series, all of which seeks to allocate responsibility across
the EU through “an order of precedence” used in examining an application. The Dublin
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Regulation is an EU legislation, binding on all members states.60 According to the Dublin
Regulation, the first country of arrival bears the of assessing asylum applications.61

i.

Safe third country

The safe third country concept, described in Article 38 the APD, is an important
mechanism for sharing the responsibility of refugee protection. Originally developed in Denmark
in 1986 and formalized through the Dublin Convention, the predecessor to the Dublin
Regulations, safe third country is based on the idea that a country’s obligation with regards to
non-refoulement does not necessarily include granting asylum.62 The safe third country could
refer to a safe country of origin, a third country, or a first country of asylum, which could be a
non-EU Member state where the asylum seeker first arrived and did not fear persecution.63 As a
result, when an asylum seeker “move[s] in an irregular manner from countries in which they
have already found protection, in order to seek asylum or permanent resettlement elsewhere,” the
asylum seeker is no longer entitled to a substantive refugee determination.64 This is because it is
presumed that the person has already enjoyed and could or should have requested refugee
protection in that earlier country. 65 The later state may then deem the asylum application
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inadmissible and send the asylum-seeker back to the earlier country.66 This following discussion
focuses on two interrelated problems: (1) the shift from examining merits of an asylum claim to
deflecting asylum seekers to another country and (2) receiving countries that are actually not
safe.
Since countries also have the right to send refugees back to the first country of asylum,
later countries focus primarily on determining whether the asylum seeker could be sent to
another country, as opposed to assessing substantive eligibility for refugee status.67 In fact,
Chapter III of Dublin III provides for a “hierarchy of grounds” to determine whether a country is
responsible for processing an asylum application: for reasons of family unity, issuance of
resident permits or visas, irregular entry and visa-waived entry.68 Absent these grounds, the EU
member country can send the asylum seeker back to the first country of asylum.69 This focus on
a third country option as opposed to merits of an asylum seeker’s application seems to contradict
the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which makes the definition of refugee constitutive so
that an asylum seeker is entitled to protection just by fulfilling the criteria, regardless of the
country they have landed in. This process has now turned into an assignment of responsibility
where the criteria are no longer related to qualifications for asylum. This also opens the
possibility for countries to have a “back door” in setting their own policies on border
management since the Convention does not create specific requirements for migrant transfer
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policies.70 However, this seems to violate Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR because it denies
the asylum seeker an individual assessment in the country where they wanted to seek asylum.
Thus, countries take advantage of the Dublin procedures to “deflect” asylums seekers before the
individuals even had a chance to make a claim for asylum avoid the responsibility for refugee
protection.71
The second problem is whether safe third countries are actually safe. 72 Article 38 of the
APD sets forth standards where use of a safe third country must still be in compliance with the
principle of non-refoulement.73 See Appendix 3. However, numerous cases have shown that
reality is otherwise. In the Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR held that the
Belgian government had violated the rights of an asylum seeker from Afghanistan under Article
3 of the ECHR by returning him to Greece, the country he had initially transited through, to
adjudicate his asylum claim. This is because it was common knowledge that the Greek
government lacked adequate asylum procedures.74 Even though the Belgian government had a
right to transfer the asylum seeker under the Dublin Regulation, returning the applicant to Greece
put the person at risk of being returned to Afghanistan where his life or freedom would be in
danger. This represents one example where superficial or formalistic compliance with the
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Convention and APD does not necessarily protect the asylum seeker rights that these documents
intended to guarantee.
Hungary represents a similar problem on a whole new level. UNHCR has urged other
European states to stop Dublin transfers to Hungary because of an amended law on asylum that
allowed the mandatory detention of asylum seekers and the expulsion of anyone who enters the
country irregularly, which violates the country’s obligations under international and European
conventions. 75 In fact, there were reports asylum seekers, including children, being detained in
shipping containers for the duration of the entire length of their asylum procedures.76
Fortunately, there are some judicial checks in the application of these regulations.
Although the first country of arrival has responsibility for evaluating asylum applications, the
ECHR will not allow subsequent countries to use this against the asylum seekers in defense of a
Protocol 4 Article 4 violation where groups of asylum seekers are expelled without due
process.77 However, judicial enforcements are less effective when victims lack the ability and
resources to access the courts in practicality.
Subsequent case law has also been helpful in protecting refugee rights and reducing the
negative consequences of the deflection procedures. NS v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department involved an Afghan national who was removed to Greece from the UK after he was
initially detained in Greece and expelled to Turkey before he had even arrived at the UK to make
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an asylum claim.78 In this case, the Court of Justice of the European Union reinforced the ruling
from M.S.S. v. Belgium and held that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to a Member State
where there are ‘systemic’ deficiencies in the asylum procedure and substantial grounds to
believe that asylum seeker would be exposed to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.79
Unfortunately, there have been many other cases of unsafe transfers to states like Italy and
Bulgaria.80 Because the Dublin Regulations intend to provide for a system in burden sharing,
these deficiencies in the system could only increase burden on other countries and render the
whole system defective.
As a result, without the proper safeguards, these procedural regulations for responsibility
sharing create loopholes that endanger refugee rights. Specifically, while the safe third country
concept was intended to distribute responsibility of hosting refugees or asylum seekers, it has
opened a path for shirking responsibilities at the outset of the process that has left asylum seekers
with less protection than they are entitled under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, safe third
regulations operate based on the assumption that all countries within the system uphold the same
standard for refugee protection. However, that is not always the case, especially when combined
with other mechanisms such as readmission agreements, discussed below.
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B. Readmission Agreements
Whether taking the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements, readmission agreements
are rooted in Article 79(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
which forms the basis of EU law. 81 Article 79(3) grants the European Union and its members the
power to “conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their countries of
origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions
for entry, presence or residence in the territory of one of the Member States.”82 Readmission
agreements represent another instrument of responsibility sharing as they provide a means for a
country to send refugees back to transit countries, known as the receiving country. However, in
practice, these agreements become problematic because sending countries do not always
guarantee refugee safety in the receiving country and because the terms of readmission
agreements have become part of a quid pro quo manner of dealing between border countries.
Readmission agreements typically set out administrative and operational procedures for
countries to cooperate on identification of irregular migrants and regulation of migration flow at
the border.83 In a typical readmissions arrangement, a country outside of the EU, such as
Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya, acts as the receiving state while a European country on the southern
border of the EU is the requesting or sending state. 84 This section discusses the EU-Turkey
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Readmission Agreement as an example. To begin, the provisions of the agreement apply to any
person who does not or no longer fulfills the requirements for entrance or residence Turkey or
the EU.85 This would include any third country nationals who might have passed through
Turkey on their way to the sending country but is deemed unqualified for refugee status as well
as Turkish citizens who no longer have a legal permit for living in the EU.86
Similar to the problem of “safe” non-EU third countries that are not actually safe, one of
the dangers with readmission agreements is chain refoulement, whereby migrants are indirectly
transported back into their country of origin or another in which their well-founded fear also
exists.87 Responsibility sharing through readmission agreements increases the likelihood of
chain refoulement when the safe third country criteria from Article 38 of the APD are not
integrated into readmissions agreements. Moreover, since receiving countries are North African
states, asylum seekers would likely lose the protection of the ECHR. For example, Libya
participates in a readmission arrangement with Italy but does not fulfill the Article 38 criteria for
a safe third country, primarily because it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Nevertheless, Italy has already trained the Libya Coast Guard members in an effort to
intercepting irregular migrants before they can arrive on the Italian coast.88 Another less obvious
example is Morocco. While a District Court in the Netherlands ruled Morocco as a safe third
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country, its status is being appealed.89 As recent as August 2018, Amnesty International reported
an incident where Moroccan authorities arrested 150 sub-Saharan people in Tangier, bussing
them to southern cities and abandoning them.90 In another incident, Moroccan security services
set camps on fire, burned migrants’ belongings and stole mobile phones.91 Thus, even seemingly
safe states that participate readmission agreements may violate the principle of non-refoulement
and jeopardize the rights of asylum seekers in the EU who are entitled to both the protection of
the ECHR and the Convention.
Another problem with readmission agreements is how they have been used in quid pro
quo political bargaining between sending and receiving countries. Since these readmission
agreements are usually signed between the EU and neighboring developing countries in North
Africa, there is some inherent asymmetry in terms of political bargaining power during the
negotiation of terms.92 At the same time, real-world implementation of these agreements
revealed even more abuse, from both sending and receiving countries.
The EU-Turkey Agreement was a well-known agreement for migrant burden sharing
while Turkey and Greece also had an accompanying readmission agreement. Nevertheless, after
the migrants are removed from the EU, they are sometimes automatically detained, even if they
were not crossing in an irregular situation.93 Turkey also suspended the readmission agreement
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after Greece released Turkish soldiers who participated in the attempted coup of 2016.94 While
this move was used to create political pressure on Greece, it likely had a real impact on how
migrants are treated as suspending readmission constrains Greek resources for migrants. This
kind of tit-for-tat interaction between states has turned international responsibility for migrant
protection into levers for exerting political pressure, a complete departure from the rights based
framework of the international conventions. The asylum seekers would thus suffer the ultimate
consequences, deprived of the rights they were entitled to and with hardly any advocates to
represent them.
The exchange between Greece and Turkey is not the only example. In 2018, Aziz
Ajanuch, the Moroccan Minister of Agriculture, publically threatened to loosen control over the
border while negotiating the agricultural and fisheries agreement with the EU.95 Less than two
weeks later, hundreds of sub-Saharan migrants entered Spain through the Ceuta fence. Shortly
after, the fisheries agreement was signed and Morocco won a desired term as well as €55 Million
in supplementary funding for Morocco and Tunisia.96 Morocco then readmitted 116 of the
migrants who had crossed over to Spanish Ceuta and arrested hundreds of sub-Saharan African
migrants in Moroccan territory.97 The arrested migrants were removed from their camps and
homes in cities like Rabat, and dropped off in the southern part of Morocco, far away from the
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border it shares with Spain.98 The quid pro quo nature of these actions ignores the agency and
individual rights of migrants that are guaranteed by the 1951 Refugee Convention, which binds
all of these countries. This type of political practice turns asylum seekers and refugees into
numbers and bargaining chips, which runs contrary to the asylum seekers’ right to individualized
assessments guaranteed under ECHR Article 4 of Protocol 4 and right to an effective remedy, as
guaranteed under Article13 of ECHR.99 In fact, scholars have also noted that there seems to be a
fundamental mismatch. On the one hand, the principle of fundamental human rights is that they
are universal. On the other hand, the current implementation through readmission agreements
and mobility partnerships, discussed below, suggests that state parties attempt to contract around
these rights.100 The readmission agreements and the subsequent quid pro quo practice of trading
readmission of migrants for economic benefits seem to commercialize border management,
which is a function of sovereignty.101

C. Mobility Partnerships
Another agreement-based tool for responsibility sharing is the mobility partnerships
between the EU and countries in North Africa. These mobility partnerships were formed under
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), an EU initiative based on Article 8 of the TFEU.102
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Article 8 provides that “the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring
countries” through specific agreements with the countries concerned that consist of reciprocal
rights, obligations, and joint actions.103 Other sources of legal authority includes TFEU Title V
on the Union’s external actions as well as Article 206-207 and Article 216-219, which focus on
trade and international agreements respectively.104 The mobility partnerships represent politically
symbolic relationships and provide a non-legally binding basis for negotiation.105 Through an
analysis of the text of the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership (“the Mobility Partnership”) as a
representative example, this section will show that a mobility partnership is an indirect
responsibility sharing tool that is a further departure from the rights-based framework presented
in the Convention. This is because the EU incentivizes North African countries to take up more
of the refugee protection burden by providing them with benefits in adjacent policy areas like
trade and conflating different migration issues.

i.

Issue conflation across policy areas
Various terms of the Mobility Partnership that discuss different policy areas from trade to

irregular migration management seem to form a package deal where Morocco is being offered
various economic benefits to absorb more readmissions. Beginning with the framing of the
partnership, the Mobility Partnership states that:
“[39] the signatory parties take the view that the elements contained in the various
components of this partnership will be implemented using a balanced overall approach
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and constitute a package, particularly the visa and readmission facilitation agreements,”
emphasis added.106
Visa and readmission refer to partially overlapping but different segments of the migration
population. Visas give permission for Moroccan nationals to live and work in the EU while
readmissions require Morocco to take in both Moroccan nationals that no longer qualify to live
in the EU as well as the irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa that might have passed
through Morocco on their way to the EU but was eventually turned away. More importantly,
Morocco’s attitude towards these two populations are vastly different. To some extent, Morocco
as a nation would advocate for more visas or rights for its nationals but there is no one to
advocate for more refugee admittances. As a country of finite resources, Morocco would be
unlikely to prioritize providing for refugees or using its political capital to help them assert their
asylum claims. When both issues are discussed in the same breath and open for negotiation, the
asylum seekers and refugees have no advocate for the enforcement of rights that are guaranteed
under international conventions and no place at the bargaining table.
In order to incentivize Morocco to take up more responsibility in migration management,
the Mobility Partnership promises other types of benefits. However, this has become more of
responsibility shifting, whereby EU wanted help with border enforcement without sharing in the
responsibility of an actual resolution for migrants. In fact, under the heading “Migration and
Development,” only two of the seven terms were tenuously related to the development of
Morocco while all other terms focused on Moroccan migrants abroad:
“[21] to strengthen cooperation between Morocco and the EU…in support of the socioeconomic development regions with high migration potential by implementing targeted
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policies and encouraging investment, including by Moroccans resident abroad, in order to
generate employment…
[26] To encourage migrants to invest productively in Morocco, in particular by
promoting the financial education of the migrants and recipient families.”
Optimistically, paragraph 21 looks like a development strategy of pre-emptively reducing the
need for involuntary migration. However, a closer look at the section reveals that nearly all the
beneficial terms are directed at Moroccan nationals in the EU, which makes a lot of sense given
the signatories of the agreement. Morocco may want to benefit from terms like:
“[23] To help Moroccan migrants residing legally in the EU to acquire vocational or
academic skills which will enable them to develop viable economic activities and
improve their employability on their return to Morocco,” or
“[25] To enhance the establishment of measures in the EU and Morocco to reduce the
cost of remittances by Moroccan migrants, in cooperation as appropriate with
relevant private-sector actors.”
While both of these promises benefit Morocco and its nationals, asylum seekers from other
countries are again left without advocates or checks to help enforce their rights in a conversation
that significantly affects their treatment and ability to assert their right to asylum.
Finally, it is helpful to contextualize the Mobility Partnership among other practices
prevalent in the region. For example, the Netherlands spends official development funds on
capacity- building of the Ghanaian government directly related to migration control.107 The 2006
French-Senegalese bilateral agreement also provides an example of development money being
spent on goals such as the modernization of the Senegalese police apparatus (aimed at
controlling irregular migration) and information campaigns against irregular migration.”108 Thus,
in general, it is unclear if mobility partnerships increase development assistance or simply divert
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it. Nevertheless, this type of issue conflation and linkage with other types of international
cooperation distort incentives for how each country would treat migrants in their country. Both
the textual and contextual evidence suggest that these “package deal” border management
mechanisms drive crucial countries further away from the rights guaranteed under the 1951
Convention. Recalling the agriculture and fisheries agreement with Morocco in the previous
section on Readmission Agreements, there is no clear winner in this strategy as the migrant
problems persist so that Europe needs to give more economic incentives in other policy areas to
get the help of its neighboring countries. As a result, Europe seems to be “subjugating an evergrowing share of its foreign policy and trade agendas to the appeasement of Turkey and Libya’s
authoritarian leaders.”109

ii.

Conflation of different types of irregular migrants
From a personal safety perspective, the more dangerous type of issue conflation is the

lack of distinction between irregular migrants who are asylum seekers and other types of
migrants, which ranges from undocumented economic migrants to human traffickers to drug
smugglers. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has noted
that linking irregular migration with human trafficking gives the false impression that irregular
migration is a criminal offense linked to security concerns and crime even though that is not
always the case. Nevertheless, the danger of this type of issue conflation is that law enforcement
assistance designed to stop the flow of illicit materials may have the additional effect of sealing
borders, encouraging push-backs (discussed below), and increasing apprehensions and reducing
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access to protection mechanisms.110 Making the journey more dangerous for asylum seekers
might simply push them to seek out even more dangerous routes, creating a downward spiral of
needing more measures and yet higher costs for managing borders.111
An example of this type of issue conflation can be seen in the Mobility Partnership.
Under the heading “Preventing and combating illegal immigration, people-smuggling, border
management” (emphasis added), paragraph 13 of the agreement states that:
“[13] To resume negotiations between the EU and Morocco in order to conclude a
balanced readmission agreement, with provisions relating to third-country nationals
as well as accompanying measures and reconciling the need for operational efficiency
with the requirement to observe the fundamental rights of migrants.”
Categorizing this item under a heading about illegal immigrants suggests that the real target for
border management is third-country nationals, as a homogenous, illegal group, which would be
an overgeneralization that infringes on the rights of those who are genuinely seeking asylum and
transiting through Morocco. According to Article 31 of the Convention, a third-country national
who is fleeing political persecution is within their rights to arrive at the Spanish border to apply
for asylum. See Appendix 1. Nevertheless, as border security increases, migrants resort to more
informal and dangerous ways to cross borders. In both 2015 and 2016, the Mediterranean Sea
accounted for around 60% of migrant deaths and missing migrants recorded by the International
Organization for Migration.112 Thus, while the concept of cross-border partnership is designed
for collaboration in sharing the burden of refugee protection, the politicization of the issue has
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shifted real life practice from a rights-based approach for handling migrants to a pure numbers
approach.

D. Joint Border Enforcement
As alluded to in the previous section, problematic collaboration is not limited to
agreements but also manifest in real danger at the borders. “Hot returns” or “pushbacks” refer to
the practice where border agents on both sides of a border collaborating to return migrants upon
crossing, without asking any questions regarding identifications and personal circumstance.
These border encounters emerged from the practice of joint enforcement of a border and
represent yet another example of responsibility sharing that have led to deprivation of migrant
rights and even violence. Similar to the previously mentioned relationship between Italy and
Libya, Spain has used the joint enforcement of its border with Morocco to shift responsibility
and liability, giving rise to cases like N.D. and N.T. v Spain.113
Today, the Ceuta and Melilla borders in between Spain and Morocco have become a testing
ground for Europe’s attempt to externalize its borders.114 The N.D. and N.T. v. Spain case involved
two individuals, N.D. and N.T., from Mali and Cote d’ivoire respectively, who were among a group
of sub-Saharan migrants crossing into Spain at Melilla. Both the Spanish Guardia Civil and the
Moroccan law-enforcement officials pursued the group and allegedly inflicted violence upon
individuals in the group. As soon as the migrants jumped down from the fence at the border, the
Guardia Civil apprehended them and sent them back to Morocco, without checking identity or
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personal circumstance or checking for identification. While the ECtHR found violation of both
Article 13 and Article 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR in this case, there are potentially thousands of
others who do not make it to court. 115 Moreover, there have also been reports that “Moroccan
forces not only considerably outnumber Spanish ones but, strategically detain Sub-Saharan
Africans before they can reach the Spanish Border Asylum Office.”116 Additionally, “a Spanish
Army helicopter leaves the city every week to identify the camps on Moroccan territory. This is
routinely followed by the brutal destruction of the camps by the Moroccan Special Forces,
accompanied by detentions and violence against the migrants and asylum seekers.”117
All of these practices exist in the name of collaboration or joint enforcement of the
border. While the strain of resources on border countries are real and warrant addressing, the
procedures for handling irregular migration cannot be so wholly divorced from the rights-based
framework that more than one hundred countries committed to more than half a century ago. The
refugee crisis has now become ongoing and more than half of today’s refugees have been
displaced for over 4 years.118 As such, it is more important than ever to reincorporate the rightsbased approach into responsibility sharing mechanisms.
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IV.

Policy Notes for the Future
It is beyond the scope of this paper to put forth a comprehensive proposal that would

address every concern with burden sharing and border management. Nevertheless, this section
seeks to examine existing and potential reform efforts on two priority dimensions: global
distribution of refugee protection responsibilities and enhanced supervision of the 1951
Convention.
i.

Global responsibility sharing

The 2016 New York Declaration and the Global Compact for Refugees (“the GCR”) are
two of most recent international efforts to improve burden sharing. The New York Declaration
was a UN resolution adopted by all 193 Member States that committed to sharing the
international responsibility of protecting refugees more equitably and predictably.119 As a followup to the New York Declaration, the High Commissioner for Refugees proposed the GCR in
2018 and it was adopted by the UN General Assembly.120 The GCR is a compact, or a nonlegally binding, political – legal international instrument subsidiary to existing international
agreements.121 While both of these documents emphasize the concept of responsibility sharing,
this paper has shown that practice can be much different and dangerously so.
Nevertheless, the GCR does show some promise. First of all, it speaks of responsibility
sharing in global terms, not on regional terms restricted to origination countries and neighboring
countries that migrants can reach. This distinction warrants attention because all the
aforementioned mechanisms for responsibility sharing were confined to border countries,
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making the burden of border management a zero-sum game. As a result, responsibility sharing
became responsibility shifting, which created incentives for countries to seek means like
readmission agreements to ease their own burden at the expense of migrant rights. As described
in the GCR, “Global Refugee Forums” are global, ministerial-level meetings for bringing
financial and technical assistance from across the world. Hopefully, these new mechanisms may
relieve some pressure from Europe and other countries that are neighbors to the origination
countries of migrants and refugees.122
Additionally, the GCR introduces “Support Platforms,” a mechanism that host countries
can activate to seek financial, material, and technical assistance as well as resettlement pathways
for admission to third countries.123 Each Support Platform would engage a group of states that
are “specific to the context.” While it is unclear what “context” this phrase refers to, such a
mechanism could give the host country more agency. Moreover, engaging a seemingly ad hoc
group of states might open up more resources to the host country and mitigate the political
bargaining with same players. For example, if Support Platforms can bring in funding from other
parts of the world, this mechanism can diminish the need for transit countries like Morocco and
Turkey to participate in quid pro quo exchanges with neighboring states in Europe.
ii.

Enhanced supervision of 1951 Convention rights

While the concept of responsibility sharing is to some extent filled with practical
concerns and good intentions, it is of the utmost importance to find ways back to the rights-based
framework established by the Convention. Lack of enforcement mechanisms is a unique
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weakness of the 1951 Convention.124 Scholars have thus proposed both a preventative strategy
and an evaluative strategy to drive better adherence to the Convention.
The preventative strategy includes setting up a special committee that would issue nonlegally binding but authoritative advisory opinions on issues such as whether a third country is
truly a safe receiving country.125 Publication of these advisory opinions would be helpful for
different countries to have more consistent and clearer interpretations of their obligations under
the Convention. Nevertheless, the ultimate effectiveness of this special committee would depend
on countries’ willingness to take on the administrative cost of asking for advisory opinions and
eventual efforts and availability of funding for following the advisory committee.
In contrast, the evaluative strategy takes a post hoc perspective and establishes a
committee to address complaints and determine whether a certain state practice is in compliance
with the Convention.126 Members of the committee can even undertake country visits and
conduct talks with government bodies or civil society representatives to assess the situation at
hand. 127 After the investigation, the findings and recommendations would be made public. Since
UNHCR collects periodic information on the condition of refugees and laws or regulations
relating to refugees through the Universal Periodic Review authorized by Article 35 of the
Convention, collaboration between UNCHR and this committee would provide periodic checks
on the implementation of the committee’s recommendations, even if they are not legally
binding.128
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Taking abroad view, the international nature of refugee issues creates unique difficulties
for allocation of resources and enforcement of rights. As a result, neither the global distribution
mechanisms nor the supervisory proposals can work alone. While it is difficult to implement
new, legally binding solutions, the two aforementioned proposals are likely to be more palatable
to governments and therefore represent promising ways to both help countries share in the
responsibility of refugee protection and provide a quality check on the result.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 – Key Provisions of 1951 Refugee Convention
Article 31: Refugees unlawfully in the country of refugee
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was
threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other
than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in
the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting
States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain
admission into another country.
Article 32: Expulsion
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of
national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling rea- sons of national security
otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to
appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or
persons specially designated by the competent authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek
legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during
that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.
Article 33: Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”)
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes
a danger to the community of that country.
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Appendix 2 – Key Provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
Article 1: Obligation to respect Human Rights
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.
Article 13: Right to effective remedy
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
Protocol No. 4, Article 4: Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens
Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.
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Appendix 3 – Safe third country provision in the Asylum Procedures Directive
Article 38: The concept of safe third country
3. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent
authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in
accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned:
(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
(b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU;
(c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is
respected;
(d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and
(e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive
protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
4. The application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules laid down in
national law, including:
(a) rules requiring a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on
the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country;
(b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy themselves that
the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or to a particular
applicant. Such methodology shall include case-by-case consideration of the safety of
the country for a particular applicant and/or national designation of countries
considered to be generally safe;
(c) rules in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination of
whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a
minimum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application of the safe third
country concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in his or her
particular circumstances. The applicant shall also be allowed to challenge the
existence of a connection between him or her and the third country in accordance
with point (a).
5. When implementing a decision solely based on this Article, Member States shall:
(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and
(b) provide him or her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in
the language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.
6. Where the third country does not permit the applicant to enter its territory, Member States
shall ensure that access to a procedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and
guarantees described in Chapter II.
7. Member States shall inform the Commission periodically of the countries to which this
concept is applied in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
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